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DUTIES, DISCLOSURE, AND DISCORD:
NECESSITY TO RESOLVE CIRCUIT SPLIT
AND CERTAINTY LEIDOS COULD HAVE
CLARIFIED FOR LITIGATION STRATEGY
AND RISK ALLOCATION
DAMIAN P. GALLAGHER*
ABSTRACT
Securities litigation is a complex, specialized, and detailed
practice of the law that depends on the expertise of courts and the
Securities and Exchange Commission. From its inception, the securities laws, namely the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, provided a baseline expectation and prescription for the Securities and Exchange Commission to promulgate
rules to fulfill the organic statute’s demands. Through time, technology, and the law generally, the securities laws have expanded
significantly, not only asking, but also requiring, the courts to
answer questions never contemplated by the original drafters of the
laws to guide this industry.
This Note purports to explain the outcome of a case the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to answer the reach
of a promulgated regulation. Namely, whether Item 303 of Regulation S-K permits a Rule 10b-5 action for securities fraud through
omitted statements. Because the parties themselves dismissed the
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lawsuit before the Supreme Court could actually answer the question, based on the circuit split and the Supreme Court’s current
jurisprudence and outlook with the securities laws, this Note will
suggest the impact Leidos could have had on the industry and
the implications generally.

2019]

DUTIES, DISCLOSURE, DISCORD—LEIDOS

257

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 258
I. ESSENTIAL STATUTORY BACKGROUND AND SECURITIES
LAW PROVISIONS...................................................................... 260
II. SPLIT CIRCUITS AND SETTING THE STAGE FOR LEIDOS ........... 265
A. The Second Circuit ............................................................ 266
B. The Ninth Circuit .............................................................. 268
C. The Third Circuit .............................................................. 270
D. Thoughts on Which Circuit Got It Right .......................... 271
III. THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI .............................. 272
A. Petitioner’s Arguments....................................................... 272
B. Respondent’s Arguments ................................................... 276
IV. LIKELY SUPREME COURT HOLDING AND ANALYSIS ............... 280
A. Articles Relating to the Leidos Argument ......................... 280
B. The Likely Holding ............................................................ 282
V. IMPACT LEIDOS COULD HAVE HAD AND SIGNIFICANCE IN THE
SECURITIES REGIME ................................................................. 284
CONCLUSION ............................................................................... 286

258 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:255
INTRODUCTION
Without a doubt, the securities industry presents new problems for litigators to evaluate, argue, brief, and present new solutions. Time has only brought more questions, and as the courts
attempt to answer these questions, it only leads to more ambiguities
and subsequent follow-up questions.
After a traumatic economic crash and the tragedy of the
Great Depression, Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933
(Securities Act), and later the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Exchange Act),1 which created the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). The Acts permit the SEC to promulgate rules to carry
out the agency’s purpose.2 While the Acts cover a wide range of
prohibitive activities and lawsuits, Section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act is the applicable section that prohibits insider trading.3 Under
the authority of Section 10(b), the SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5
to fulfill the statute’s mission.4
It is clear that corporate insiders or individuals who have
access to inside information have affirmative duties to disclose
trades on such information or to abstain from trading from information; failure to comply with these duties can result in prosecutions under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for fraud, insider trading,
or both, by the SEC or the Department of Justice.5 In other cases,
courts have extended liability in cases where there is a material
omission.6 This seems counterintuitive because, ordinarily, a failure
to act does not trigger liability in the common law regime.7 So
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended
by 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2010)) [hereinafter Exchange Act].
2 The SEC has described its mission “to protect investors, maintain fair,
orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.” Additionally,
the SEC was created in 1934 “to enforce the newly-passed securities laws.”
U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, What We Do (June 10, 2013), https://www.sec
.gov/Article/whatwedo.html [https://perma.cc/3AAM-TCU4].
3 Exchange Act § 78j.
4 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1951).
5 See In the Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 901, 908 (1964).
6 William Shotzbarger, Business and Friendship Don’t Mix: The Government’s
Expansion of Insider Trading Liability Under SEC Rule 10B5-2, 65 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 579, 580 (2015) (discussing the SEC’s expansion of confidential relationships that could give rise to liability for insider trading).
7 Michael Corrado, Is There an Act Requirement in the Criminal Law?, 142
U. PA. L. REV. 1529, 1532 (1993–94) (discussing how American law generally
requires an affirmative act for criminal liability).
1
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how can someone violate the law by failing to act or even provide
uncertain information? Violating the law in this scenario is more
likely than one would imagine.
In Leidos, the Supreme Court of the United States granted
certiorari to answer just this question: “[w]hether the Second Circuit erred in holding—in direct conflict with the decisions of the
Third and Ninth Circuits—that Item 303 of SEC Regulation S-K
creates a duty to disclose that is actionable under Section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5.”8 Leidos
effectively offered the opportunity to answer whether Item 303
created an additional actionable duty under Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5.9
Previous scholarly work has addressed the circuit split that
would later be granted certiorari by the Supreme Court.10 Further,
“it is clear that harmonizing holdings in Stratte-McClure and Cohen
into a single coherent legal principle does not stretch limits of logical possibility.”11 This premise perfectly illuminates the opportunity
that Leidos could have offered had it not been dismissed under
Supreme Court rules.
This Note aims to assess the parties’ arguments in Leidos,
which the Supreme Court would have addressed had it ruled on
the merits of the case. Part I will discuss the essential statutory
background in the securities law world, including necessary provisions, the growth of Rule 10b-5, and the normative policy arguments that guide the federal securities laws.12 Moreover, it will
evaluate Item 303 and Private Shareholder Litigation suits. Scholarly discussion on Item 303 and the interplay of Rule 10b-5 and
private enforcement actions will further set the stage for Leidos.13
Part II tackles a potential holding where the various iterations
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Leidos, Inc. v. Ind. Pub. Ret. Sys., 137 S.
Ct. 1395 (2017) (No. 16-581).
9 Id.
10 See Brian Currie, Note, Much Ado About Nothing: The Limits of Liability
For Item 303 Omissions and the Circuit Split That Never Was, 8 WM. & MARY
BUS. L. REV. 379, 404–05 (2017) (finding that there never actually was a circuit
split because the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit “based their decisions
upon similar readings of the same cases,” and “[it] seems that [the split] is
merely a story of a circuit court split that simply never existed—but created a
stir nonetheless”) (alteration in original).
11 Id.
12 See infra Part I.
13 See infra Part I.
8
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of the cases are described in detail to vet out the factual and legal
background behind the cases.14 Subsequently, Part III articulates
both the Petitioner’s and Respondent’s arguments on the question
granted for certiorari.15 With this background, Part IV fleshes
out the various Circuit Court of Appeal opinions that create the
circuit split outlined in the Petitioner’s and Respondent’s arguments.16 Part V will attempt to assess what the Supreme Court
could have held were the case not dismissed.17 Finally, the Conclusion catalogues the impact that a ruling in Leidos could have in
the securities law world.18 Policy arguments will be framed around
a chilling effect on disclosure, better market pricing for the fundamental value of stocks, litigation cost analytics in private
plaintiff suits, and finally, an assessment of risk allocation and
litigation certainty.
I.ESSENTIAL STATUTORY BACKGROUND AND
SECURITIES LAW PROVISIONS
In order to understand Leidos, it is integral to understand
the securities law landscape, statutes, and applicable rules that
give rise to duties. This Part will first provide a detailed assessment of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. Second, this Part
will unravel Rule 10b-5, the elements to bring such an action,
and some scholarly commentary on Rule 10b-5 generally. Third,
this Section will scrutinize Regulation S-K’s Item 303, the provision’s language, SEC commentary, and additional information to
truly comprehend the disclosure requirement. Subsequently, Part I
will explain the nature of private shareholder litigation when in
reference to Item 303.
Both the Securities Act of 193319 and the Securities Exchange Act of 193420 were designed to combat fraud and protect
investors generally after the catastrophic stock market crash in
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
16 See infra Part IV.
17 See infra Part V.
18 See infra Conclusion.
19 Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 77(a) et seq. (2012)).
20 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) et seq. (2012)).
14
15
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1929.21 While the 1933 Act certainly is important, it only applies to
the purchase of securities, whereas the 1934 Act applies to the
purchase or sale of securities.22 Section (b) of the Exchange Act
prohibits entities:
To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange ... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe
as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.23

Based on an initial reading, even scholars generally recognize that the provision is not clear in what it proscribes.24 Because there is an apparent lack of legislative history or rather, the
record is not sufficient to allow scholars to glean meaning,25 scholars
have ascertained that Section 10(b) has two conceptions.26 The
“Prevailing Conception” comes from the Supreme Court’s narrow
construction of Section 10(b)’s language and prohibition of broad
prosecuting power.27 The article cites to the Supreme Court’s reading of Section 10(b) in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,28 which relied
on “any manipulative device or contrivance” as a necessarily broad
proscription instead of enumerated devices in order to “fulfill the
See Securities Act of 1933, INVESTOPEDIA (2018), https://www.investope
dia.com/terms/s/securitiesact1933.asp [https://perma.cc/SY62-HUA4] (stating
that the 1933 Act was designed to protect purchasers of securities on the primary
market through well-designed prospectuses and sufficient financial information to
make well-informed decisions).
22 See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(2)(3) (2018).
23 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2010).
24 See Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act., 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 386 (1990) (“It would be very hard to define
exactly what section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 forbid. It is surely impossible to say
in a nutshell.”).
25 Id. at 388 (“Although the Court had declared that the history of section
10(b) supports its [narrow] reading, it usually added that section 10(b) has
almost no history.”). Their notes that the Supreme Court has discussed the
legislative history in footnote 15. Id. (discussing Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680,
690 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201–06 (1976); Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975)).
26 Id. at 386.
27 Id.
28 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202 (1976).
21
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objectives of the Exchange Act.”29 The Court then limited the
broad language to certain cases of “misconduct involving deception,
misrepresentation, or nondisclosure.”30 Steve Thel’s “Alternative
Conception” is the 1934 Act’s concern for securities pricing since
the Act considers “several critical factors affecting prices including production and dissemination of information that might affect
prices, the flow of money into and out of the market, and the basic
structure of the securities market.”31 But regardless of the history used to support either conception, the individuals who debate
which conception prevails all seem to agree that the “Act conferred open-ended rulemaking authority on the SEC.”32
One thing is clear with regard to Section 10(b): the SEC
promulgated Rule 10b-5 as a result of the statute’s language.33
Rule 10b-5 makes it:
[U]nlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce ... (a) to
employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) to make any
untrue statement of material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made ... not
misleading, or (c) to engage in any act ... which operates or
would operate as fraud or deceit upon any person ....34

With the securities statutory landscape explained, the question before the Court, here, is about Regulation S-K and Item
303.35 Regulation S-K largely handles the filing of nonfinancial
statements in accordance with the prescribed securities laws and
SEC Interpretive Releases.36 The regulation states that this section is concerned with registrant’s future projections.37 When
management makes such projections, they must have a “good faith
Thel, supra note 24, at 387.
Id. at 388.
31 Id. at 391 (“The theme that ties the Act together is a concern with securities prices.”).
32 Id. at 394.
33 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1951).
34 Id.
35 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Leidos, Inc. v. Ind. Pub. Ret. Sys.,
137 S. Ct. 1395 (2017) (No. 16-581).
36 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(a) (2019).
37 Id. § 229.10(b) (“The Commission encourages the use in documents ... of
managements projection of future economic performance that have a reasonable basis and are presented in an appropriate format.”).
29
30
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assessment” of the foreseeable performance and also “have a reasonable basis for such an assessment.”38 The regulation emphasizes
the importance of communicating clearly to the investor, especially
with previous projections:
With respect to previously issued projections, registrants are reminded of their responsibility to make full and prompt disclosure
of material facts, both favorable and unfavorable, regarding their
financial condition. This responsibility may extend to situations
where management knows or has reason to know that its previously disclosed projections no longer have a reasonable basis.39

Broadly speaking, Regulation S-K is predicated on the
importance of providing transparency to the investor.40 Or more
simply, the regulation is investor-focused.
The broad intentions and prescriptions of Regulation S-K aid
the understanding of Section 229.303, which is commonly referred
to as Item 303.41 Item 303’s title refers to “[m]anagement’s discussion and analysis of financial condition and results of operations”
(usually simplified as MD&A).42 The regulation is predominantly
concerned with five areas of management’s disclosure: liquidity,
capital resources, results of operations, off-balance sheet arrangements, and tabular disclosure of contractual obligations.43 For
transparency’s sake, the regulation requires for management to
“[d]iscuss [the] registrant’s financial condition, changes in financial condition and results of operations.”44
Objectively, Item 303 imposes affirmative requirements with
which managers must comply.45 For example, the registrant must
Id. § 229.10(b)(1).
Id. § 229.10(b)(3)(iii).
40 Id. § 229.10(b)(1) stating:
[t]he Commission also believes that investor understanding would
be enhanced by disclosure of the assumptions which in management’s opinion are most significant to the projections or are
the key factors upon which the financial results of the enterprise
depend and encourages disclosure of assumptions in a manner
that will provide a framework for analysis of the projection.
41 Id. § 229.303.
42 Id.
43 Id. § 229.303(a)(1)–(5).
44 Id. § 229.303(a).
45 Id.
38
39
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report “any unusual or infrequent events or transactions or any
significant economic changes” that could have a material impact
on reported income.46 Further, the regulation requires registrants
to “[d]escribe any known trends or uncertainties” that the registrant would reasonably believe to have a material impact on net
sales and revenues.47 Largely, the burden rests with the registrant to make decisions that could be tangentially related.48
These forward-looking statements have been conceptualized
in the academic community.49 Even with the clear statutory language, “at first blush the regulation seems to require disclosure
of all forward-looking information; the use of the word ‘known’
operates purportedly as a distinction for disclosures grounded in
current knowledge and purely predictive disclosures.”50 Setting
aside the elements of a securities fraud private cause of action, it is
unclear to courts “whether all required Item 303 disclosures are
material under the federal securities laws.”51
Scholars have tried to answer this very question of materiality and whether Item 303 violations are sufficient for the elements to be pleaded.52 Claiming that Item 303 does not cross the
materiality threshold required by case law (see Basic v. Levinson53),
Matthew Ady believes that there are real litigation hurdles for
Item 303–based causes of action.54 One such barrier is the lack
of recovery for speculated damages coupled with “strict standards
Id. § 229.303(a)(3)(i).
Id. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii).
48 Id. § 229.303(a) (“Where in the registrant’s judgment a discussion of segment
information and/or of other subdivisions (e.g., geographic areas) of the registrant’s
business would be appropriate to an understanding of such business, the discussion shall focus on each relevant, reportable segment and/or other ... as a whole.”).
49 See Brian Neach, Note, Item 303’s Role in Private Causes of Action Under
the Federal Securities Laws, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 741, 741 (2001) (“Stated
simply, a ‘forward-looking statement’ in the context of securities law represents a
statement ‘describ[ing] events or activities that will occur, if at all, at some future
date.’” (quoting James D. Cox et al., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 1997))).
50 Id. at 744.
51 Id. at 752.
52 See Matthew Ady, Living in a Material World: Does a Violation of Item
303 of Regulation S-K Satisfy the Materiality Element in a Rule 10b-5 Cause
of Action?, 17 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 401, 403 (2017).
53 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 249–50 (1987).
54 Ady, supra note 52, at 433.
46
47
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set by PSLRA and the Supreme Court ....”55 While private causes
of action may be limited for plaintiffs, the author does note that the
SEC can still circumvent the 10b-5 action by way of a mere Item
303 violation.56 By analyzing studies evaluating the necessary
threshold of what percentage would be necessary for “reasonably
likely,” Ady quite simply states “Item 303 would mandate disclosure
of that uncertainty.”57
Other scholars take a less measurable approach to materiality and instead focus on the implications of failing to effectively litigate Item 303 violations.58 Such shortfalls result in less
information being available to investors, less efficient markets,
and less informed investment decisions.59 While encouraging more
enforcement of Item 303 as private 10b-5 causes of action, Suzanne
Romajas claims and supports the notion that “the SEC’s general
position [is] that not all forward-looking information must be disclosed.”60 The SEC has taken steps through interpretive releases
to explain what the Item 303 standard is for MD&A; however,
“the standards for disclosure, particularly as they relate to forwardlooking information, remain uncertain.”61
II.SPLIT CIRCUITS AND SETTING THE STAGE FOR LEIDOS
Part of the Supreme Court’s essential calculus for granting
certiorari is the existence of a circuit split. “A conflict among the
circuits is probably the most important criterion for the grant of
certiorari.”62 Such splits are often viewed as troubling.63 This Part
Id. at 433–34.
Id. at 434 (“Pursuant to the Exchange Act, the SEC may impose a civil fine
on companies that violate Item 303, and it often does.”).
57 Id. at 429.
58 See Suzanne J. Romajas, Note, The Duty to Disclose Forward-Looking Information: A Look at the Future of MD&A, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 245, 247 (1993).
59 Id.
60 Id. at 257.
61 Id. at 286.
62 Marybeth Herald, Reversed, Vacated, and Split: The Supreme Court, the
Ninth Circuit, and the Congress, 77 OR. L. REV. 405, 431 n.130 (citing H.W. Perry,
Jr., Deciding to Decide: Agenda Setting in the United States Supreme Court,
100 (1991)).
63 Id. at 431 (“[C]ircuit splits are unseemly and unsettling because at least
two panels of learned judges have come to opposite conclusions on a legal point.
Although lawyers may thrive on the absence of a clear rule, the public perception
may be that the system is irrational and unfair.”).
55
56
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aims to walk through the split between the Second Circuit, the
Third Circuit, and the Ninth Circuit, focusing on the legal analysis
behind the split. Specifically, this Part focuses on emphasizing the
factual distinctions made in the Second Circuit’s analysis of Regulation S-K because it was the Circuit Court that drew attention to
the split.
A.The Second Circuit
In Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, the Second Circuit
held, as a matter of first impression, “that a failure to make a
required Item 303 disclosure in a 10-Q filing is indeed an omission that can serve as the basis for a Section 10(b) securities
fraud claim.”64 Arriving at such a conclusion, the Second Circuit
recognized that generally, “[s]ilence, absent a duty to disclose, is
not misleading under Rule 10b-5.”65 But while this common law
concept does not impose liability absent a duty to disclose, Item
303 imposes an affirmative duty to disclose in Form 10-Qs, and
fraud in these filings can constitute fraud under Section 10(b).66
The Second Circuit noted that “[w]e have already held that failing
to comply with Item 303 by omitting known trends or uncertainties
from a registration statement or prospectus is actionable under
Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933.”67 Citing
Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, the Second Circuit
pointed out that the language tracks similar verbiage in Rule 10b-5,
which requires disclosure of “material fact[s] necessary in order
to make ... statements made ... not misleading.”68 By virtue of the
requirement that entities use affirmative disclosure of information to avoid making registration statements and filings misleading,
the court ascertained that “omitting an item required to be disclosed
on a 10-Q can render that financial statement misleading.”69
Further, the court grounded its reasoning that an omission can be
as misleading as affirmative statements because these disclosures
“give investors an opportunity to look at the registrant through
776 F.3d 94, 100 (2d Cir. 2015).
Id. at 100–01 (citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.7 (1988));
see also Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980).
66 Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 101.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 102.
69 Id.
64
65
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the eyes of management by providing a historical and prospective analysis of the registrant’s financial condition and results of
operations.”70 Since Item 303 and disclosures generally offer investors an opportunity to assess the registrant, such an investor
“would interpret the absence of an Item 303 disclosure to imply
the nonexistence of ‘known trends or uncertainties ....’”71
The court proceeded, stating that sustaining an omission
claim under Item 303 will only prevail under Rule 10b-5 if the
omission would be “material” under the Rule.72 This requires the
private plaintiff bringing the action to demonstrate that the defendant failed to meet Item 303’s requirements.73 Then, the plaintiff
must show that the defendant had such a duty to disclose the
omission under Item 303, followed by a showing that the omission
was material.74
The Second Circuit forwardly recognized that its conclusion—that an omission under Item 303 could give rise to liability—
is incompatible with differing conclusions in the Ninth and Third
Circuits.75 The Second Circuit addressed the Third Circuit’s confusing standard in Oran,76 which some courts believed it to hold
that an Item 303 omission “does not automatically give rise to a
material omission under Rule 10b-5”77 and clarified that the Third
Circuit actually held that Item 303 could give rise to a material
10b-5 omission standard.78 The Second Circuit determined that
the Third Circuit’s holding is consistent with its opinion in the
fact “[a]t a minimum, Oran is consistent with our decision that
failure to comply with Item 303 ... can give rise to liability under
Rule 10b-5 so long as the omission is material ....”79
In applying the legal standard it deemed appropriate for
omissions under Item 303, the Second Circuit affirmed the District
Id. (citing Exchange Act Release No. 6835, 1989 SEC LEXIS 1011).
Id. (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii)); see also Donald C. Langevoort
& G. Mitu Gulati, The Muddled Duty to Disclose Under Rule 10b-5, 57 VAND.
L. REV. 1639, 1680 (2004).
72 Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 102.
73 Id. at 103.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 288 (3d Cir. 2000).
77 Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 103 (quoting Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d
275 (3d Cir. 2000)) (emphasis in original).
78 Id. at 103 (emphasis in original).
79 Id. at 103–04.
70
71
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Court’s dismissal of the claim because of plaintiff’s pleading shortcomings.80 However, the court, addressing the merits, also found
that the defendants did breach the duty imposed by Item 303
because the defendant (Morgan Stanley) faced a deteriorating market and failed to disclose future trading losses “that would materially affect the company’s financial condition.”81 Morgan Stanley
rebutted plaintiff’s claim that its Item 303 disclosure was inadequate with the fact that Morgan Stanley did, in fact, disclose in
reference to deterioration of positions in other markets.82 But the
court found that the disclosure trends were “generic,” “spread out,”
and “unconnected to the company’s financial position.”83 The
court reiterated the SEC’s expectation and Item 303’s imposition
that disclosures include both a “discussion” and an “analysis” to
be sufficient.84
As such, the Second Circuit held that omitted information
fails to comply with the demands of Item 303 and this constitutes
an actionable fraud suit.85 This holding, different from the Ninth
Circuit below, widens the circuit split that gave rise to Leidos.86
Should the Supreme Court side with the Second Circuit approach,
the court which has been referenced as the “Mother Court” for securities,87 then liability would be greatly expanded through omitted
information that an investor would reasonably want to know.
B.The Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit, in NVIDIA Corp., held that Item 303
did not create a duty to disclose under the applicable statutes at
play.88 The court grounded its reasoning in the required duties
Id. at 106.
Id. at 104.
82 Id. at 105 (“[D]isclosing the deterioration of the real estate, credit, and subprime mortgage markets, and its potential negatively to affect Morgan Stanley.”).
83 Id.
84 Id. (citing 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii)).
85 Id. at 107.
86 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3–4, Leidos, Inc. v. Ind. Pub. Ret.
Sys., 137 S. Ct. 1395 (2017) (No. 16-581).
87 See generally James D. Zirin, The Mother Court: A.K.A., the Southern District Court of New York, ABA (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org
/groups/young_lawyers/publications/tyl/topics/legal-history/the-mother-court-aka
-southern-district-court-new-york/ [https://perma.cc/8LJC-QN39].
88 In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d 1046, 1055 (9th Cir. 2014).
80
81
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that typically give rise to a violation of Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5.89 Essentially, relying on established principles, the court
asserted that liability under the applicable statutes can only arise
“from an omission in contravention of an affirmative legal disclosure obligation.”90 In the ordinary application of the law, the
court noted that Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 do not create such an
obligation “unless omission of that information would cause other information that is disclosed to be misleading.”91
The court proceeded to address the plaintiff’s citation to
Simon v. American Power-Conversion Corp., a case in which the
judge found that Item 303 does create an affirmative duty to
disclose and that the defendant’s failure to disclose created an
actionable claim.92 However, the Ninth Circuit noted that the
judge in Simon later clarified his opinion, writing that “[a]s this
Court noted in Simon, the disclosure rules are probative of what
defendants are otherwise obliged to disclose but do not, themselves,
provide an independent duty of disclosure.”93 The court then concludes, on the same case, that a plaintiff cannot rely on an Item
303 omission to prove that a defendant’s omitted information was
material.94 The court concluded that Item 303 “does not create a
duty to disclose for purposes of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5” and
that a separate duty must be shown through principles in Basic
and Matrixx Initiatives.95
The Ninth Circuit recognized and was “persuaded by [Oran’s]
reasoning” in ascertaining the proper ruling on an Item 303 omission giving rise to a violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.96
The court was persuaded by the varying tests required in Item
303 and the materiality principles established in Basic.97 Noting
Id.
Id. at 1055–56 (quoting Panther Partners v. Ikanos Comm., Inc., 681
F.3d 114, 120 (2d Cir. 2012)).
91 Id. at 1056 (citing Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27,
43 (2011)).
92 Id. (referencing Simon v. Am. Power Conversion Corp., 945 F. Supp. 416
(D.R.I. 1996)).
93 Id. (quoting Kafenbaum v. GTECH Holdings Corp., 217 F. Supp. 2d 238,
249 (D.R.I. 2002)).
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 1054.
97 Id. at 1055.
89
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that Item 303 requires more disclosure than what Basic requires,
“what must be disclosed under Item 303 is not necessarily required
under the standard in Basic.”98 The court proceeded to adopt the
Oran ideology that an Item 303 material omission does not certainly give rise to a 10b-5 violation.99
C.The Third Circuit
The Third Circuit’s Oran decision affords a closer relationship to the holding of the Ninth Circuit than the Second Circuit
case, but equally complicates the circuit split.100 “[T]he ‘demonstration of a violation of the disclosure requirements of Item 303
does not lead inevitably to the conclusion that such disclosure would
be required under Rule 10b-5. Such a duty to disclose must be separately shown.’”101 The court tried to wrestle between the competing statements offered in traditional 10b-5 analysis and the SEC’s
interpretation of Item 303.102 Noting that the SEC’s interpretation of Item 303 “varies considerably from the general test for
securities fraud materiality set out by the Supreme Court in Basic,
Inc. v. Levinson[,]” the court was nevertheless convinced that the
materiality requirements for a 10b-5 action do not give deference to
a presumption that an Item 303 shortcoming establishes actionable
fraud.103 Convinced by the findings in the SEC’s discussion that
“[d]isclosure is then required unless management determines
that a material effect on the registrant’s financial condition or
results of operations is not reasonably likely to occur[,]” the court
asserted that “SK-303’s disclosure obligations extend considerably beyond those required by Rule 10b-5.”104
Id.
Id. (quoting Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 288 (3d Cir. 2000)).
100 Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 288 (3d Cir. 2000).
101 Id. at 288 (quoting Alfus v. Pyramid Tech. Corp., 764 F. Supp. 598, 608
(N.D. Cal. 1991)); see also In re Sofamor Danek Group, Inc., 123 F.3d 394, 402
(6th Cir. 1997); Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194 (1st Cir. 1996); In re
Quintel Entertainment, Inc., Sec. Litig., 72 F. Supp. 2d 283, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1999);
Wilensky v. Digital Equip. Corp., 903 F. Supp. 173, 181 n.10 (D. Mass. 1995), rev’d
in part on other grounds sub nom; Kriendler v. Chemical Waste Management,
877 F. Supp. 1140, 1157 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
102 Oran, 226 F.3d at 287.
103 Id. at 288.
104 Id. at 287–88.
98
99

2019]

DUTIES, DISCLOSURE, DISCORD—LEIDOS

271

Thus, the Third Circuit effectively held that violating Regulation S-K’s Item 303 “does not automatically give rise to a material
omission under Rule 10b-5.”105
D.Thoughts on Which Circuit Got It Right
Each Circuit’s approach has its virtues and vices. Without
getting too mired in the thoughts on which the courts’ opinions
were predication and, perhaps, the political underpinnings of the
courts themselves, it would seem that the Supreme Court would
prefer the Second Circuit approach. This makes sense for a few
practical reasons. First, the Southern District of New York and the
Second Circuit handle a large amount of securities-related actions.
Not only is a Regional Office of the Securities and Exchange Commission stationed in New York City, but these enforcement actions along with private enforcement actions are tried and appealed
regularly in these courts.106 Practically, the courts that frequently
adjudicate these matters would be in the best position to determine the law. Further, the Second Circuit approach construes the
securities laws liberally, which is both a common statutory interpretation approach and policy decision.107
On the other hand, the Third and Ninth Circuit are reserved in expanding liability.108 Private parties would prefer this
reading of Regulation S-K. It is more predictable and does not
force companies to over-disclose in fear of litigation.
What might lend more insight to this inquiry are the arguments put forth by the Petitioner and Respondent for the Leidos
case.
Id. at 288.
See Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize?
(The Same Way Everybody Else Does—Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities
Fraud Opinions, 51 EMORY L.J. 83, 85 n.6 (2002) (“Instead, the real experts
are the district court judges in the districts in New York ... who see securities
fraud cases as a routine matter.”).
107 See Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 99–100 (7th Cir. 1997);
Goodman v. Epstein, 583 F.2d 388, 410 (7th Cir. 1978) (“To effectuate the broad
remedial purpose of the federal security laws, they are to be construed liberally
and flexibly.”) (referencing Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967)); Daniel
v. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223, 1231 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
granted, 434 U.S. 1061 (1978).
108 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 10, Leidos, Inc. v. Ind. Pub. Ret. Sys.,
137 S. Ct. 1395 (2017) (No. 16-581).
105
106
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III.THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
In the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, the question presented was “[w]hether the Second Circuit erred in holding—in direct
conflict with the decisions of the Third and Ninth Circuits—that
Item 303 of SEC Regulation S-K creates a duty to disclose that
is actionable under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5.”109
A.Petitioner’s Arguments
In its Brief for a Writ of Certiorari,110 the Petitioner framed
the question presented with an emphasis on whether Item 303
created a newly enforceable duty under Rule 10b-5 in order to find
that no such actionable duty exists.111 Petitioner argued first, that
Item 303 of Regulation S-K does not create an actionable duty
for private class action suits and second, that policy considerations are insufficient arguments to impose liability based on the
securities laws’ “text and structure.”112
Petitioner’s first argument relies on Basic v. Levinson’s
assertion that “[s]ilence, absent a duty to disclose, is not misleading
under Rule 10b-5[ ]”113 and thus does not create a private cause
of action.114 The Court has only recognized an actionable duty in
two situations. First, where there is an affirmative duty not to mislead.115 So, for an omission to be actionable, as stated by Matrixx
Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano,116 that omission must make an
affirmative statement misleading.117 “A pure omission—where
no statement is made at all—is not actionable.”118 Second, when
Id. at i.
In more than one way, the arguments have been simplified to the extent necessary to provide the most substantive and legally relevant facts for a
discussion later in this Note. For any further reference or clarity, evaluate the
Petitioner’s brief as cited within this Section.
111 Brief for Petitioner at i, Leidos, Inc. v. Ind. Pub. Ret. Sys., 137 S. Ct.
1395 (2017) (No. 16-581).
112 Id. at 14, 17.
113 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 224 n.17 (1988).
114 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 111, at 14.
115 Id. at 15 (citing Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 240 n.18 (1987), and
the “duty not to mislead”).
116 Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 44–45 (2011).
117 Id. at 44.
118 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 111, at 15.
109
110
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a relationship of trust and confidence exists, there is a fiduciary
duty to disclose.119
In cases where the Court has recognized enforceable duties,
“[it] has found an actionable disclosure duty in only two scenarios,
and both involve something more than an omission itself.”120 As
previously mentioned, the first variety is supported by Section
10(b)’s text and common law fraud principles, which is a duty to
not mislead because “[t]he focus remains on the statement, not
on the omission.”121 The Petitioner emphasized the notion that
this variety of duties or obligations requires affirmative misrepresentations and “does not encompass the type of ‘pure omissions’
alleged by [Respondents] here.”122
Petitioner cited to cases, including Basic, opining this foundational concept of the securities industry, but further emphasized
the context in the private action through Congress’s enactment of
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA).123 Petitioner stated that when Congress enacted PSLRA, it adopted
Rule 10b-5(b)’s assertion that omissions can become actionable “only
if an affirmative statement is rendered misleading.”124 The PSLRA
codified a very limited set of misleading statements: just false
statements amounting to half-truths as well as typical affirmatively misleading statements.125 Further, Petitioner not only argued
that Plaintiff-Respondents failed to specify how
each statement could be misleading (a statutory requirement under the
PSLRA126), but also succinctly contended, “[a] pure omission
claim cannot satisfy the PSLRA’s” pleading necessities.127
Petitioner’s second argument, relying on the fiduciary duty
to disclose, rested on the understanding stated in Chiarella128
Id. (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980)).
Id. at 20 (emphasis in original).
121 Id. at 21 (citing Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 240 n.18 (1987), and In
re Vivendi, S.A. Sec. Litig., 838 F.3d 223, 240 (2d Cir. 2016)).
122 Brief for Petitioner at 21–22, Leidos, Inc. v. Ind. Pub. Ret. Sys., 137 S.
Ct. 1395 (2017) (No. 16-581).
123 Id. at 24.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980) (holding that “a duty
to disclose under § 10(b) does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic
119
120
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that relationships of trust and confidence create a duty to either
disclose or abstain from disclosing.129 A derivation of common law
fraud, caveat emptor, this duty created an obligation to disclose
material nonpublic information to insiders before trading, or otherwise, abstain from acting on such information.130 The Court has
permitted such a dealing to arise through legal obligations or
courses of dealing other than a duty to comply with the federal
securities antifraud principles.131
After recognizing that the duties applicable to private
rights of actions are limited in these two contexts, the Petitioner
stated that the Second Circuit erred by creating an actionable
third duty.132 This third duty permits an action through a “registrant’s silence where Item 303—or presumably any of the Commission’s thousands of other disclosure requirements—allegedly
mandates that the information be disclosed.”133 Essentially, Petitioner argued that the Second Circuit expanded the statutory
proscription in both section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 “well beyond
the boundaries established by Congress to include a liability
theory that no court of appeals had held was actionable before
the PSLRA was enacted.”134 The Petitioner grounded this argument in statutory language as well as the fact that it is the
Commission’s responsibility to execute securities laws through
enforcement proceedings, not private actions.135
market information”). There, the Court found that a financial-services printing
company employee who discerned merging parties and profited from such
knowledge was precluded from enforcement because he owed no duty of trust
and confidence to the parties with whom the information was about.
129 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 111, at 25–26.
130 Id. at 26 (citing case discussion on difference between applying pure omissions between 10b-5(a), 10b-5(b), and 10b-5(c), finding that 10b-5(a) and (c)
required something more than just a pure omission).
131 Id. at 27 (citing Dirks v. SEC, 462 U.S. 646, 665 (1983), and noting that
there, there was no prior dealing with the target company to create an actionable duty).
132 Id. at 27–28 (“This case involves neither duty. The operative complaint
specifies no statement in the March 2011 10-K that was rendered misleading
by the omission of the CityTime fraud; and SAIC had no fiduciary-type duty
to disclose this information to aftermarket investors. That should have been
the end of the § 10(b) analysis.”).
133 Id. at 28.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 28–29.
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Among the statutory and legal support that Petitioner cited,
Petitioner also substantiated its argument through public policy
rationale.136 Its policy arguments included: an impediment to the
current disclosure regulation regime through private enforcement
actions and the fact that it would also encourage hindsightdriven litigation.137
By implication from the Brief, the SEC has an interest in
managing its disclosure requirements, and it has particular intentions when it enacts regulations (like S-K): “[t]he Commission’s
goal has been to make Item 303 a vehicle for meaningful disclosure.”138 Additionally, “[p]rivate enforcement of Item 303 pure
omissions ... would affirmatively incentivize registrants to flood
the market with immaterial and premature disclosures.”139 “[I]nvestors would be buried ‘in an avalanche of trivial information.’”140
This would lead to poorer decision making, could reduce incentives,
and also reduce market participation generally.141 Registrants
would over-disclose to avoid litigation, which would “engender
market confusion or competitive losses that justified withholding
the information in the first place.”142
On the point of hindsight-driven litigation, Petitioner argued
that PSLRA was prescribed specifically to manage the private suits,
and concerns of consistently filed litigation were even included in
the House Reports.143 The third duty from the Second Circuit,
Petitioners argued, would permit expanding litigation for plaintiffs “even without alleging a misleading statement or the reason
why the statement is misleading, as expressly required by the
PSLRA.”144 And if legitimized with Item 303, the holding could
be expanded for the “thousands of separate and distinct reporting
requirements.”145 Such a holding, if constitutionalized and set
for precedent, could harm the legitimacy of the SEC to do its work
Id. at 41.
Id. at 47–48.
138 Id. at 42–43.
139 Id. at 44.
140 Id. at 45 (quoting Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1987) (internal
citations omitted)).
141 Id.
142 Id. at 47.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 48.
145 Id. at 49.
136
137
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through its disclosure regime and even complicate the SEC’s work
for updating the requirements it seeks to enforce.146
B.Respondent’s Arguments
This Section aims to dissect and explain Respondent’s arguments submitted to the Supreme Court. In some aspects, the
arguments are simplified for the purposes of this Note, and for
further analysis, please review the brief in its entirety.147
The Respondent, expectedly, framed the question presented
so as to create a duty through omission.148 The argument Respondent presented is twofold. First, by omitting required information as
dictated by Regulation S-K, the issuer in fact engages in a deceptive action.149 Second, permitting liability through deceptive omissions actually advances Congress’s favored practice of disclosure.150
Respondent substantiated its first argument that omissions
are deceptive by claiming that annually required information is
material and that omitting that information is deceptive through
the statutory language of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.151 “As its
text demonstrates, [section] 10(b) broadly prohibits the use of
‘any ... deceptive device or contrivance.’”152 As Respondent noted,
investors rely on annually filed reports and “can be led to believe
(incorrectly) that the omitted facts do not exist ....”153 Thereby,
investors are accepting the annual report as facially valid and as
“a truthful depiction.”154 By relying on the statutory language,
Respondent further cited to Omnicare,155 noting that in assessing
Id.
See generally Brief for Respondent, Leidos, Inc. v. Ind. Pub. Ret. Sys.,
137 S. Ct. 1395 (2017) (No. 16-581).
148 Id. at i (“Whether an issuer of publicly traded securities that deceptively
omits from a securities filing material information required to be disclosed under
Item 303 of SEC Regulation S-K violates [section] 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5.”).
149 Id. at 21.
150 Id. at 45.
151 Id. at 21.
152 Id. at 21–22 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)).
153 Id. at 22.
154 Id.
155 See generally Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus.
Pension Fund, 135 S. Ct. 1318 (2015).
146
147

2019]

DUTIES, DISCLOSURE, DISCORD—LEIDOS

277

whether a fact is material depends on the perspective of a reasonable investor.156 The Respondent asserted that “‘if a registration
statement omits material facts about the issuer’s inquiry into or
knowledge concerning a statement of opinion, and if those facts
conflict with what a reasonable investor would take from the
statement itself, then [the applicable section’s] omissions clause
creates liability.’”157 In essence, Respondent tried to articulate
that a similar approach should be applied here because investors
assess statements from registrations as true or, at the very least,
as forthright representations of the company’s current state.158
Much of the Respondent’s argument relies on the assertion
that by deliberately omitting material information as required
by the SEC’s disclosure regime, such omissions are deceptive.159
This argument is substantiated by several facts that the Respondent pointed to: investors’ expectations that frequent filings are
required by the SEC, the filing’s cover page including the SEC’s
name, and certifications by the executive officers.160 Due to investors’ reliance on such filings, omitted information is deceptive.161
Respondent then provided an example that if executives failed to
disclose a criminal proceeding against one of them, the reader would
assume that no such proceeding is actually happening, thus making
the failure to disclose deceptive.162 Respondent then makes its
argument, in regard to Item 303 and MD&A, that it is such an
important section for investors because it provides investors the
opportunity to evaluate the registrant and make informed decisions.163 Here, the Petitioner’s MD&A was sixteen pages and aims
to provide analyses of trends or uncertainties to the extent that they
would have “a material impact” on the registrant and if anything is
Brief for Respondent, supra note 147, at 22 (citing Omnicare, 135 S. Ct.
at 1327).
157 Id. (citing Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1329).
158 Id. at 23–24.
159 Id. at 23.
160 Id. at 23–24.
161 Id. at 24 (“The omission of required information from an annual report is
deceptive when it leads investors to the erroneous conclusion that material omitted facts do not exist.”).
162 Id. (citing Donald C. Langevoort & G. Mitu Gulati, The Muddled Duty
to Disclose Under Rule 10b-5, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1639, 1680 (2004) (suggesting
that “deliberate omissions” have the “potential to mislead”)).
163 Id. at 25–26.
156
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not disclosed, “a reasonable investor would assume that no unidentified trends or uncertainties exist.”164 If an issuer is in fact
aware of uncertainties that would be material and chooses to
omit it from the MD&A, as required by Item 303, then “its deliberate omission of that required information is deceptive” and this
“falls within [section] 10(b)’s prohibition of any ‘deceptive device
or contrivance.’”165
Respondent then proceeded to analyze the deliberate omission in the context of Rule 10b-5 and found that it satisfied each
of Rule 10b-5’s prongs.166
Second, Respondent asserted that companies have no such
right to deceive investors by omitting information.167 Respondent
challenged Petitioner’s characterization of “pure omissions[,]”
since Petitioner rebutted its own argument by filing a report
designated to comply with the SEC’s regulations.168 Petitioner,
in 2011, filed as a “risk factor” that future prospects would suffer
by relying on government contracts, and later, for this suit, omitted
the fact for CityTime having a similar effect.169 Respondent plainly
stated “[t]hat is deception, not ‘pure omission.’”170 Respondent
further assessed Petitioner’s argument that the Court’s previous
“fiduciary-type duty” cases never involved issuers and stated simply
that in those cases, the defendants were strangers to the issuers
and as such, “generally had no obligations to disclose information to investors.”171 Those cases relied on finding a duty of
trust and confidence, which later triggered a duty to disclose or
Id. at 26.
Id.
166 Id. at 27–29 (The court proceeds to analyze the remaining elements of a
10b-5 action. First, the omission would satisfy the materiality prong because a
reasonable investor would want to know about that decision (most of the time for
securities cases, its understood that a material fact is any fact that would affect a
reasonably prudent investor) because the omission would be one of many material
facts. Next, coupled with the scienter to withhold that information, it would satisfy
the statute’s requirement that the disclosure omits information that would constitute “both a ‘device, scheme, or artifice to defraud’ and an ‘act, practice, or
course of business’ that ‘operates ... as a fraud or deceit.’” (citing 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5(a), (c))).
167 Id. at 30.
168 Id. at 31.
169 Id. (emphasis added).
170 Id.
171 Id. at 32.
164
165
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abstain from trading.172 Respondent distinguished typical duties
as just described from issuers’ duties by the fact that issuers
“are the object of the 1934 Act’s disclosure regime.”173 As such, it
could not be within Congress’s intent when it passed the statute
to carve out an exception for issuers when the facial purpose of
the 1934 Act was to, in effect, prevent issuers from deceiving
through nondisclosure.174
Respondent’s final contention, that omissions constitute
deception, was that the PSLRA does not limit the scope of deception as Petitioner would have the court believe, since “Petitioner
misread the statute.”175 The provision that Petitioner cited (15
U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1))176 applies only to certain private actions, but
“[t]hat provision contains no language suggesting an intent to
cover all possible theories of private liability.”177 A private plaintiff can satisfy the law’s provision by specifying the statements that
were misleading and why omitting that information was misleading.178 The fact that a material fact was omitted is not sufficient
for a plaintiff to recover since a plaintiff must also prove deception.179 “[M]eaning that the failure to disclose required information was misleading under the circumstances.”180 Plaintiffs must
further prove materiality, reliance, scienter, loss causation, and
finally, damages; by proving all of the necessary elements, then,
plaintiffs can enforce section 10(b)’s and Rule 10b-5’s “prohibition on deception and fraud, not Regulation S-K.”181
The Respondent’s second argument on appeal was that
enforcing liability through deceptive omissions advances Congress’s intent because permitting the Petitioner’s argument
would in fact undermine the SEC’s ability to deter future fraudulent conduct.182
Id.
Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)(2) (“‘[e]very issuer ... reports’ as the Commission requires[.]”)).
174 Id.
175 Id. at 39.
176 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1).
177 Brief for Respondent, supra note 147, at 40.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 44–45.
180 Id. at 45.
181 Id. (emphasis added).
182 Id.
172
173
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Finally, Respondent argued that the federal courts possess the judicial economy to handle the fraud claims that may
come as a result of ruling in its favor.183 Respondent noted that
Petitioner’s policy arguments do not sufficiently frame the legislative purpose.184 Congress, in passing the 1934 Act, had a clear
intention and it “serves the ‘fundamental purpose’ of implementing ‘a philosophy of full disclosure.’”185 Respondent asserted that
Petitioner’s argument would “undoubtedly strip the Commission
of power to police the type of fraud at issue here.”186 The “falsity”
element of proving fraud would effectively render the Commission’s job difficult since it had previously used Item 303 as a basis
for liability.187
IV.LIKELY SUPREME COURT HOLDING AND ANALYSIS
This Part presents a potential holding for Leidos had the
Supreme Court ruled on the merits. Before reaching such conclusions, this Part will address existing scholarly works on Item
303 as well as Leidos generally. The considerations examined in
the works will aid in formulating a likely holding.
A.Articles Relating to the Leidos Argument
There are scholars, like Matthew Turk and Karen Woody,
who truly believe that there was not, in fact, a circuit split, rendering Leidos as an illusory securities law obscurity.188 They even
believe that aside from the Second Circuit declaring that there
was a circuit split, the Second and Ninth Circuits are actually in
“full agreement.”189 Turk and Woody find that the actual reasoning between the circuit split rests on two misunderstandings:
first, that a duty to disclose, in and of itself, “does not establish a
set of conditions that may ‘trigger’” disclosures under Item 303
Id.
Id.
185 Id. (quoting Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1640 n.1 (2017)).
186 Id. at 46.
187 Id. at 46–47.
188 See Matthew C. Turk & Karen E. Woody, The Leidos Mixup and the
Misunderstood Duty to Disclose in Securities Law, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
957, 957 (2018).
189 Id. at 962.
183
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and Rule 10b-5;190 and second, that the duty that Leidos might
address matters only in the insider trading context, rendering it
less than ground-breaking.191 Referencing judicial “analytical
gymnastics,” the authors find that Item 303 omissions could give
rise to liability.192 However, liability would only extend “provided
that the Basic standard of materiality is met.”193 Further, the
authors bolster their propositions by observing that regulations in
the securities industry have “developed in an extremely fragmented
and piecemeal fashion” since the founding of the United States’
securities laws.194 Similarly, the authors note that cases like this,
i.e., an evaluation of duties and disclosure requirements, tend to
illustrate how opinions are formed and construed.195 Simply put,
the authors found that there was no disparity to resolve because
courts were just conflating two different standards.196 The authors find that a failure to comply with Item 303 could offer actionable fraud claims, but not necessarily in every case.197 Finally,
the article did leave the idea that Leidos will, one day, insist
that “the Court ... confront an intractable disagreement over how
much disclosure firms are required to provide to investors under
federal law.”198 The authors believe such questions can be answered with a proper understanding of the securities disclosure
regime requirements.199
The authors were correct that the Court would need to
answer this question of whether omissions are viable actions under
Regulation S-K and when the Supreme Court granted certiorari,
they thought so too.200 But the authors are underwhelming in how
they classify the split. It is not a mere difference of standards or
Id. at 967.
Id.
192 Id. at 1010.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 1012 (“What stands out in those opinions, however, is how consistently they converge on a common strategy, which is to seize upon any
available distinction that allows the legal materials to be examined as narrowly as possible.”).
196 Id. at 991.
197 Id. at 959, 991.
198 Id. at 1033.
199 Id. at 1034.
200 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Leidos, Inc., v. Ind. Pub. Ret. Sys., 137
S. Ct. 1395 (2017) (No. 16-581).
190
191
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approaches. Unique to the securities laws, compared to other
laws, is the fact that securities laws are built on both statutory
and common-law grounds. Because of this, as the authors refer
to “fragmented” is more reason for the Supreme Court to answer
disparities.201 Additionally, the authors grounded their analysis
on the notion that because these are in the insider trading context of the securities laws, that the analysis would not necessarily
apply for widespread disclosure duties.202 Again, this analysis
seems underinformed to the extent that the securities laws have
a great deal of overlap both in doctrine and in application. Sources
of the laws as mentioned are versed and because of this, they can
be applied in the insider trading context, private fraud actions,
SEC 10b-5 actions, in the criminal context with the appropriate
culpability, and so forth. So, it does not follow that because these
cases and facts under the split are perhaps different that the Supreme Court should not answer the question as a matter of certainty for litigants.
B.The Likely Holding
With the circuit split, the various academic takes on the
outcome, and the parties’ arguments before the Supreme Court,
it leaves the momentous time for how the Supreme Court would
actually rule in this matter uncertain. Simply recapping, the Supreme Court has a few options before it to choose. The Second
Circuit suggests that material omissions can give rise to liability.203
The Ninth Circuit purports that Item 303 does not create a duty
to disclose otherwise omitted information.204 The Third Circuit,
favoring a “cousin” to the Ninth Circuit’s holding, does not totally
preclude liability since an omission “does not lead inevitably to
the conclusion” that a disclosure would be required.205 With these
three options, the circuit split, how would the Supreme Court of
the United States rule?
If this question was easily answerable, not only would time
and money be saved, but years of litigation would be avoided.
The difficultly in this question lies not only in how the Supreme
Turk & Woody, supra note 188, at 1010.
Id. at 1028–29.
203 Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 102 (2d Cir. 2015).
204 In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d 1046, 1055 (9th Cir. 2014).
205 Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 288 (3d Cir. 2000).
201
202
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Court would hold, but also the approach and rationale to get there.
Law school demonstrates the breadth of holdings and the disparity
of how and when Justices act when they do. So, it is worth mentioning the many ways the Court could approach the case.
Second, the Supreme Court could use tools and theories of
statutory interpretation to ascertain the promulgated regulation’s
meaning. Here, the Court would evaluate the ordinary meaning of
the text, look at dictionaries, legislative history, and understand the
underpinnings of the regulation. The Court would have its clerks go
through the comments submitted before promulgation to ascertain a specific intent behind the statute.
Third, and perhaps finally, the Court would take a practical
approach to the question. Arguably, the Court will evaluate the
repercussions of a holding one way or the other. Justices may rely
on their own notions of what the law should be or how Congress
likely wished it to be carried out, square it with practicalities, and
then reach a decision.
There is reason to believe, and for sake of this Note, to
rely on the submitted briefs from the parties (and included herein).
This may tie to the practical effects just described. But at the core
of this matter is litigation exposure. The two ends, really between
the Second and Ninth Circuits, are ones of liability. Regulation
S-K will either expose individuals to sweeping liability through
material omissions, or else it will continue to create liability through
affirmatively misleading statements. Given the current composition of the Supreme Court (and all other matters equal: agency
deference afforded under Administrative Law, Statutory Interpretation, Federal Courts, and topics beyond the scope of this Note), the
Supreme Court would likely rule on the side of the Ninth Circuit.
While the Second Circuit is termed the Mother Court and
while there is reason to construe the securities laws liberally, what
is perhaps most telling is that the SEC promulgated Regulation
S-K.206 The SEC, the chief agency tasked with the securities laws,
would know whether they wanted to expand liability and simply
could have said so. Further, the Regulation pertains to management discussion and analysis by definition. The broad purpose of
this is to discuss the on-goings of the company. While this Note
does not discuss safe harbor provisions for companies, it seems
counterintuitive to hold that omissions (mindful that they must
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be material ones) could give rise to liability when the analysis is
tasked with discussing the current status. Simply, if the section
deals with disclosure, the Court may be less suspect to omissions.
Finally, as fleshed out in Part V below, there would be disparate
effects if the Supreme Court held in favor of the Second Circuit.
V.IMPACT LEIDOS COULD HAVE HAD AND SIGNIFICANCE
IN THE SECURITIES REGIME
This Part intends to develop the implications that Leidos
could have had. Whether the Supreme Court ruled in favor of
creating an additional actionable duty under Item 303 or found
that no such duty was formed, there surely would be implications.
This Part will first analyze if the ruling would have any sort of
chilling effect when it comes to disclosures generally. It will assess whether affirmative statements or omissions can create more
(or perhaps fewer) opportunities for litigation. Subsequently, this
Part will ascertain whether permitting Section 10(b) suits could aid
in better market pricing on shares’ fundamental value. Since this is
an age consistently concerned with litigation strategy and cost analysis, this Part will then develop arguments for plaintiff decisionmaking. Finally, this Part will explore risk allocation generally
in reference to stock price accuracy and individual assessment.
First, there would likely be a chilling effect should Item 303
omissions become actionable. By Item 303’s requirements, management already exposes itself through affirmative statements
where investors could argue materiality and reliance.207 While
companies and management are given a safe harbor period (beyond
the scope of this Note), assume companies and management are not
protected by them; investors literally are permitted to bring suit
on those affirmative statements. If the Court ruled that omissions are permissible to bring causes of action via the materiality
element, this would undoubtedly dissuade management from
stating even affirmative statements. Implicitly, the average investor will assume “if management is not revealing, then they must
be concealing.” Management’s forward-looking statements will be
devoid of details, of insight, and even harm innovation. Companies
might fear that trying new products or inventing new methods will
spark litigation. And with this, by not disclosing, these companies
207

Id. § 229.303.

2019]

DUTIES, DISCLOSURE, DISCORD—LEIDOS

285

will “clam up” and actually inhibit growth, something surely the
markets would not appreciate.
For litigation’s sake, it is likely to believe that omissions will
give rise to more causes of action. While settlements can always
occur, its concerning to think that by virtue of management’s discussion of the current affairs of a company, that an investor,
weary of “missing information” or information that is not discussed,
but material, does not fare well practically. In a regime that is
highly regulated, it is quite uncomfortable for management to be
held accountable for what they do not say. The reason for this is
simply that to be accountable for the world of possibilities that one
could say but does not say should not impose liability to broadly
state every fact in the alternative. For example, imagine a MD&A
where a company wants to announce the possibility of a merger.
It could say “we are now planning a merger with Company A.” If a
suit was brought because management did not say that it was
100% certain, then the company’s language would change. Perhaps
something like “we are now planning a merger with Company A,
but there is always a possibility that the merger will fall through
because the markets are uncertain, and we wish to disclose the
possibility that it is not definite.” Notice how the language is not
only lengthier, but it is also vaguer. But even under a regime
where a company could be liable, an investor still could bring a
suit on what management failed to say in even a broad disclosure.
Instead, intuitively, it makes more sense, as the law currently stands, to hold them accountable for what they do say.
Omissions are challenging because, by definition, it is unclear what
it includes. Will management have to include all possible and foreseeable harm? Will they have to release potential product designs
that competitors can then get a hold of and then compete at lower
costs? There are arguably more questions than answers in this
world where an omission-basis cause of action is adopted. And it
seems more likely than not that the Supreme Court would err on
the side of caution and leave this as a matter of agency deference.208
Second, management wants to comply with the federal securities laws. Not only are there threats of criminal sanctions through
wanton or intentional illegal acts, but the civil sanctions harm a
firm’s reputation, culture, and can inhibit the firm’s fundamental
See generally Chevron, U.S.A. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984).
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value. Commonly referred to as the inherent or true value of a share
of a company, the fundamental value drives firm behavior, among
other things.209 Scholars in the securities industry have concerned
themselves greatly with what determines the fundamental value
or even if it’s even calculable.210 While this Note does not address
these particularly, there is reason to believe that exposure to litigation will, in some ways, harm the value of a firm. Shareholders, those who would purportedly bring these private causes of
action, are actually harmed by way of litigating these omissions.
It harms the firm’s value and really, their own bottom line.
Finally, and perhaps most obviously, Regulation S-K and
Item 303 are promulgated by the SEC by way of its rule-making
power prescribed by Congress.211 As a matter of practice and even
law, it is probably in the best interest of the SEC to ascertain and
then promulgate whether Item 303 encapsulates omissions as material for a cause of action. While the judiciary has ruled by common law some aspects of the securities industry, it is a highly
regulated and reviewed industry by the SEC. The regulation is devoid of any reference to omissions and it is not clear why deference
should not be afforded to the agency in situations precisely as this.
CONCLUSION
The securities field is nothing short of complex, intricate, and
ever-changing. The disclosure regime and litigation tactics become even more cumbersome when trying to construe proscriptive
statutes while simultaneously trying to allocate risk or identify
cost structures in order to meet disclosure requirements. All in
all, the securities industry presents challenges today and really,
every day.
Leidos presented a unique opportunity for the Supreme
Court to answer a straightforward disclosure question. If the
Court answered in the affirmative—that an omission under Item
303 did create an actionable fraud claim—litigation costs surely
would rise, the stock prices would be influenced, and disclosures
See generally Ben McClure, An Introduction to Behavioral Finance, IN(Aug. 30, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/02/112502
.asp [https://perma.cc/W854-PAYH].
210 See James J. Park, Halliburton and the Integrity of the Public Corporation, 10 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 71, 72 (2015).
211 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10, 229.303.
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generally would likely be chilled. On the other hand, answering
in the negative—that such a duty does not exist—could promote
certainty, allow firms to allocate risk in their disclosures, and allow
the market to ascertain which information is valuable. But this
case also demonstrates key takeaways: how statutory language
can cause a riff in the circuits; how circuits may construe language to create a split; and, perhaps most importantly, how parties
frame arguments in order to create, or avoid creating, an entirely
new duty to disclose that would be actionable under Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5.
At the very least, this Note seeks to offer an overview of the
securities authorities at play, the creation of a circuit split, the
arguments presented by both Petitioner and Respondent, and the
likely ruling the Supreme Court would have made. Additionally,
if the Supreme Court had ruled, the impact of such a ruling would
have been as educational as the ruling itself. The securities disclosure regime needs certainty, and Leidos could have provided just
that. Perhaps a few years from now a similar fact pattern will
provide the opportunity for the Supreme Court to rule on the
merits. For now, the existence of a circuit split presents its own
problems, but that is for another note, for another time.
Item 303 and whether an omission from the Management
Discussion and Analysis constitutes actionable fraud remains
litigation-ready, where attorneys can present their best arguments
depending on their circuits. The Second Circuit may be more plaintiff friendly, whereas the Ninth may require additional materiality
to be shown. Nevertheless, this Note hopes to provide clarity in
the extremely complex world of securities litigation.

